A B ST RA C T : This article constitutes an attem pt to put forw ard som e sug gestions tow ards constructing a fram ew ork of un derstanding the processes of social construction of sexuality and gend er id entity w ith in the contex t of the ethnic conflict, and of nationa list/ populist politics in form er Y ug oslavia. In particular, it focuses on th e w ays in w h ich m asculinist discourse is articulated to the politics of ethnicity in form er Yugoslavia, by exam ining the definition and treatm ent of w om en as`biological reproducers of th e nation' throug h the discourses and p olicy proposals of moral majority na tiona list and pro-life m ovem ents in C roatia and Slo venia, and of the nationa list m ovem ent and reg im e in Serbia, and the use of rap e and sex ua l assault against w om en as`w eapons' in th e eth nic conflict in Bosnia and other republics of form er Y ug oslavia.
Introduction
In an interview w ith BBC 2' s N ew snight, broadcast in M arch 1994, Ratko M ladi c Â , m ilitary head of the arm y of the self-styled Serbian Republic of Bosnia (Republika Srpska Bosne i H ercegov ine), offering his ow n interpretation of the w ar in Bosnia-H erzeg ovina, claim ed that Bosnian Serb s w ere eng aged in w ar in Bosnia because they had to protect ' [their] w om en and child ren ' and concluded by arguing that the Bosnian conflict w as m otivated by ' love and hon our' . These statemen ts are quite rev ealin g as they epitomize the prev ailing or 'hegem onic' perceptions am ong Serb s reg arding the w ar. A n analysis of Genera l M ladic Â ' s w ord s, or m ore gen erally of the Serbian (but also Croatian) nationalist discourse, in dicates Ð as I hope to demonstrate Ð that according to those w ho w age it, the w ar tearin g apart form er Yugoslavia is regard ed as an expression of love for the ' motherla nd' , a w ar w aged prim arily by and betw een m en , despite the fact that a substantial proportion of its victim s are w omen and child ren . It is im portant, I thin k, to note G en eral M ladi c Â ' s eroticized version of nationalism and its explicitly gen dered character, as it is more or less typical of nationalist/populist discourses in form er Yugoslavia.
The aim of this article is to put forw ard some suggestion s tow ard s elaborating a framew ork for understand ing the processes by w hich sexuality and gen der iden tity are socially constructed w ithin the context of the ethn ic conflict and of nationalis t/populis t politics in form er Yugoslavia. In particular, I w ill 1350± 4630/96/010073± 19 © 1996 Journ als O xford Ltd consider the w ays in w hich m asculin ist discourse is articulated to the politics of ethnicity in form er Yugoslavia by focusing on:
1. the definition and treatm en t of w omen as ' biological reproducers of the nation' through the discourses and policy proposals of moral majority nationalist and pro-life movem en ts in C roatia and Sloven ia, and of the nationalist movem en t and reg im e in Serb ia;
2. the use of rape and sex ual assault agains t w om en as ' w eapons' in the ethnic conflict in Bosnia and other republics of former Yugoslavia.
N ationalism , Populism and Ethnic C on flict as G endered Phenom ena; som e Prolego m e na
The definition of nations as imagined communities is not new , especially since the w ork of Ben ed ict Anderson has been extrem ely influen tial am ong studen ts of nationalism (A nd erson , 1983) . N everth eless I w ill briefly consid er at this point in w hat w ays nations Ð as w ell as other form s of com munity Ð are imagined. The use of term s like im agined or im agination in everyd ay conversation often implies an opposition betw een a sphere of ' reality ' and a sphere of the ' not-real' . A nderson makes it very clear that im agin ing national communities is by no m eans creating som ething artificial. H is analysis of the construction of national comm unities also indicates that ' im aginin g' is not an exclusively 'm en tal' activity. O n the contrary, it is a len gth y process of forgin g link s betw een social groups, of inven ting com munity and suppressing differen ces, of establish ing the context in w hich the members of the comm unity under construction can develop comm on ex perien ces, and in terpret past experien ces in sim ilar w ays. 1 It involves the organization of collective m em ory Ð and thus, of collective forgettin g Ð and of the rituals and in stitutions that support such projects (H obsbaw m and Ranger, 1983) . In this sen se, imagin ation is a creative process; nations are imagined but also real, concrete en tities. Indeed , as Laclau and M ouffe (1985) Ð and before them Foucault (1972) , have sugg ested , any manifestation of thè social`is the product of this process of imagination, or of discursive construction, to use their ow n term inology. I w ould thus suggest that imagination involves creating economies of truth, m akin g sens e of the raw m aterial of social experien ce, in fact, creating this very social experien ce through discursiv e practices.
The use of the term populist in my description of nationalist movem en ts in former Yugoslavia is intend ed to draw attention to the particular m odality of identity formation that characterizes them . A s I have arg ued in more detail els ew here (Sofos, 1993 (Sofos, , 1994 , populism consists in the sim plification of the political field into tw o opposin g cam ps, or in the positing of an irrecon cilable antagonistic relations hip betw een`the people`(or`nation`, or other comm unity for that m atter) and its`other`. The positin g of this binary political and social division not only sim plifies the political field , but entails the main tenance of some sen se of homogen eity w ithin the ranks of the com munity in question as it unifies it on the basis of establish ing a relation of equivalen ce among its constituent elem ents . Very often this antagonistic relations hip is combined w ith a chain of antith etical sign ifiers w hich furth er deepen the binary division of the political field as they also are organized into chains of equivalen t elem en ts. Thus, one pole of the political is posited as good, pure, moral and threatened, w hereas its antagonistic pole is posited as bad, im pure, im moral and threatening. 2 Finally , m oving to the issue of the gen derin g of ethnic conflict, it should be stressed that national comm unities have been im agined m ost often as comm unities of m ales, as brotherh oods or, to use A nd erson ' s ow n w ords, as fratern ities`, characterized by a sens e of`deep, horizontal com radesh ip`(p. 7); nationalism therefore is gen dered not only in the case of the form er Yugoslavia. H ow ever, it is the in tensity of the lin k betw een national identity and m asculin ism and the particular w ays in w hich this is being asserted in the case of ethnic conflict in former Yugoslavia that seem s to be of particular interest.
I w ill argue that the gend ering of nationalis t and populist discourses is in stantiated through the im agin ation of the ' nation' as a prim arily or ex clusively m ale com munity, in w hich w om en are represen ted as sy mbols, boundaries or reprod ucers of the nation Ð and the nation's`Other`. In the first case (that of w omen ' belong ing' to the national com munity), w omen are subordinated through their inclusion w ithin a structured m ale-dom inated social ord er w hereb y fem ininity assumes m ainly the form of motherho od. In the second case, (that of w omen ' belon ging' to the others' national com munity) they are subordinated through , 1) their sy mbolic exclusion in their bein g repres en ted as sym bolic enem ies of the`popular/national`comm unity, and, 2) their phy sical violation, or annih ilation.
I should em phasize that this analysis is not inten ded to contribute to the creation of a neo-orien talist body of w ork that consid ers m asculin ism as the exclusive property of Balkan societies.
3 Social-historical research has dem onstrated that national and ethnic iden tity, as w ell as conflict, is inex tricably lin ked w ith particular interp retations of sexuality and w ith process es of form ation of m asculin ity and feminin ity (Mosse, 1985; Parker et al. 1992; Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992) . Rather, I seek to dem onstrate how in a situation of cris is and rapid and violen t change m asculin ism is m anifested and articulated in relation to the nationalist/populist imaginary.
N ationalist/Pop ulist Politics in Fo rm e r Y ugos lavia
Sin ce the late 1960s, a m ix ture of disconten t w ith the economic situation and aw aken ing nationalism gave rise to a chain of political protest through out the Yugoslav Fed eration. D espite Tito' s purge of the nationalis t and liberal opposition , the 1974 constitution, instead of en ablin g the ex pression of the social diversity of Yugoslavia and its republics (including, but not lim ited to ethn ic and religiou s diversity), reified republican and, by extens ion, ethn ic and national identities. It ren dered these identities the prim ary form of differentia tion w ithin Yugoslavia, by leg ally sanctionin g and naturalizing them , at the ex pense of other social and political iden tities w hich rem ained suppressed or at least excluded from the univers e of political deb ate. The process of fragmen tation gathered pace as the political dyn am ics unleash ed by the constitutional and party changes w ere complem en ted by the dram atic deterioration of the economic and social conditions durin g the late 1970s and through out the 1980s. T he in tern ational oil crisis and the w orld reces sion of the 1970s, the increasin g unem ploym en t, falling livin g standard s, high inflation, a restrictive monetary policy, com bined w ith economic mism anagem en t and the failure of the prin ciples of self-managem en t seriously underm ined the foundations of the ' social contract' , trigg ered w aves of discontent, and created an atmosphere of w idespread disappointm en t. In addition, the increasin g social dislocation in the south of the country gave rise to in tern al m igration, m ainly of Kosovo and M acedonian Albanians , to the N orth ern, more prosperous republics. In addition, partly for the same reasons and partly due to the political situation in Kosovo, local Serb and M ontenegrin m igration to Serbia and other republics intens ified (Ramet, 1992, pp. 198± 99) . These developmen ts increased the tension s w ithin the republics and migration provid ed a unifyin g issue in public d ebate and a valuable mobilization resource (Sofos, forthcom ing) . Since at least the mid-1970s, in ter-rep ublican tens ions and social issues w ere progressively perceiv ed as problem s created by the ' unn atural' breach of ethnic faultlines w ithin the context of the Yugoslav Federation. This ethnicization of socioeconom ic and political grievances eventu ally led to perceptions of irrecon cilable antagonism betw een the 'ethnic' comm unities w ithin the Federation. A s a res ult of the 1974 constitution, virtually each republic and province, despite the multicultural and multieth nic composition of Yugoslavia' s constituen t units, increasing ly provided a frame-w ork for the promotion of the national iden tity and attainm en t of sovereig nty of a specific ethnic group, facilitating in this w ay the fragmentation of the already precarious Yugoslav public sphere. Yugoslavia' s artificial and arbitrary internal borders w ere ' upgraded' to national or ' civilizational' faultlines (Bakic-H ayden and H ayden , 1992, pp. 3± 6) ; and the fed eration began to disinteg rate as a res ult of the ' ethnicization' or 'nationalization' of its republics and autonom ous units together w ith the pursuit of essen tially m onoethnic policies w ithin their bound aries . D urin g the late 1980s, the demise of the state-socialist experim en t in East/C entral Europe and the disinteg ration of the Soviet U nion und erm ined the last traces of legitim acy of the Yugoslav experim en t and affected the strategies as w ell as the composition of the republic' s elites in a variety of w ays. A cen tral elem ent of these changes res ides in the binary-populist logic of the political and cultural discourse through out Yugoslavia. Ind eed , one could distin guish several antithetical pairs em ployed in political and cultural discourse in form er Yugoslavia such as conquerors versu s conquered , oppress ors versus oppres sed , heteroc hth ones vers us autochth ones, imm oral versu s moral, impure versus pure and, sign ificantly, masculine versus fem inine and male vers us fem ale. As I w ill sh ow in the course of this paper, the last tw o pairs of opposites , based on the existenc e of sexist, masculinist cultural elem ents , have been conspicuously present in popular as w ell as in official discourse. Thus, the category 'fem inin e' has been em ployed to in clude virtually every one Ð men and w omen alike Ð not conforming to the accepted ' nationalized' versions of m asculin ity, or to the ' gend ered ' version s of national identity.
There are ind ications that the argumen ts put forw ard and the question s raised in the rem ainder of this paper apply to most of the Baltic nationalist m ovemen ts that have emerged over the past decade. I neverth eless confine m y argum en ts mainly to the cases of Serb ian, C roatian and, to a lesser extent, Sloven ian nationalism s as these are articulated in the discourse and practice of groups and individuals ranging from the political elites of the recen tly in depend en t republics, to m em bers of the groups of m ilitia irreg ulars in the w ar fronts of C roatia and Bosnia. The decision to focus on these particular nationalism s has been influen ced by the access ib ility of data and of existing resea rch.
M oral M ajorities a nd R eprod uctive Politics: the N a tionaliz ation of Fem ale Sexua lity It has been argued that in several East/C entral European societies politics has been in fluen ced by the emergen ce of post-socialist moral majority m ovemen ts (Salecl, 1994; Tsagarousianou, 1995) . The addition of the term`post-socialist`to references to moral majority m ovemen ts of East/C entral European societies w as prompted by the need to distin guish them from their w estern counterparts on the basis of tw o sign ificant criteria : 1) the convergen ce of nationalism and m oral concerns : although these m ovemen ts sh are a stron g pro-life comm itm en t and resolve w ith their counterparts in the USA and the W est, they nevertheless do so not m erely due to their moral comm itment to resp ect for`the righ t to life of the unborn`; East/C entral European moral majority m ovements elev ate the nation and its righ t to claim and mobilize all its members, even those w ho have not yet been born;
2) the emphasis on the role of the state as a guarantor of the national w ell bein g through the reg ulation of sexuality and reproduction and the provision of financial and w elfare incentives and disin centives to its ' citizen s' .
In som e of the republics of former Yugoslavia, 'm oral majority m ovements ' Ð alliances of cons ervative forces w ithin the C hurch, nationalist and righ t-w ing political and social forces Ð have had consid erable influence in sh aping the emergin g post-comm unist political agen da.
In Sloven ia, for exam ple, the d iscourse of the nationalist and C atholic Right w as reflected in the public debate w hich culminated in the 1991 draft of the constitution. In 1991, repres en tatives of the D EM OS coalition argued that w om en should not have the rig ht to abort 'future defend ers of the nation' , w hile in the 1991 draft m otherh ood w as posited as the essen ce of w om en ' s iden tity (Antic Â , 1991) . In other w ords, w om en w ere represented as`reproducers`of the national comm unity, w hose only useful and desired contrib ution to their society w ould be to bolster the nation' s demographic reg en eration w hich , according to official definitions of the situation, w as threatened by a declinin g birth rate. In the context of a continuous moral panic throughout the 1980s and early 1990s regard ing the threat of extinction of the national comm unity because of the pres en ce on Slovenian territo ry of ' m igrants' from other form er Yugoslav republics and due to the geogra phical and dem ographic position of ' a sm all Sloven ia' in the midst of potentially hostile larg er nation-states (Sofos, forthcomin g), the 1991 draft constitution subordinated w om en to the imperative of the reprod uction and preservation of a (m ale dom inated) national com munity.
A dmitted ly, the opposition to the 1991 draft constitution w as by no means neglig ib le: the final text of the 1992 Sloven ian constitution is substantially different from the 1991 draft, and does not include the latter' s controversia l sections w hich lin k female identity exclusively w ith motherho od. H ow ever, the significance of the propositions included in the draft cann ot be underestim ated, especially as they are combined w ith the recognition und er the 1992 constitution of the sanctity of life (Article 52) and the provision that statutes w ill determ ine the reproductive righ ts of w om en . They already provid e som e constitutional leg itim acy to the discourse of the Slovenian`m oral majority`w hich effectively seeks to introduce a new rig ht Ð that of the nation (i.e., of the Sloven ian ethnic comm unity and its political expression) to survive at the expen se of ind ividual or social rig hts . In fact, it could be argued that by not referring explicitly to w omen' s reprod uctive righ ts the constitutional legisla tor leaves the door ajar for a future ' moral majority' -based political coalition to introd uce restrictive leg islation .
Sim ilarly , in C roatia, one of the issues that occupied a prominen t position in the political debate shortly before indepen den ce and in the post-communist period w as that of w om en ' s rig ht to abortion. In this republic, how ever, thè moral majority`influence has been m uch m ore sig nificant than in the case of its northern neig hb our. U nlike Sloven ia, the opposition to the converg en t pro-life and nationalist forces has been considerably w eaker, and these forces virtually achieved a consens us across the (lim ited ) political spectrum reg ard ing the necessity of restric ting abortion ' for the sake of the nation'. Bolstered by the national unity clim ate that the military conflict gen erated w ith the Yugoslav People's A rm y, and later w ith the C roatian Serb res urgen ce and violen t confrontation the nationalis t rig ht, including Franjo Tudjman' s H DZ, promoted its vision for an ind epen dent, nationalis t and ' morally healthy' C roatia. C en tral in this vision w ere the notions of family, sanctity of life, and m otherh ood. The C atholic C hurch supported this movem en t by org anizing public rituals such as special ben edictions of large fam ilies held in churches in 1990, by directly in terven ing in the deb ate on the iss ue of abortion and by high lig hting the resp onsibility of the Sabor (the C roatian parliamen t) 'to God, to history, and to the nation' (Ivekovic Â , 1995, pp. 400± 1) to forbid abortion. In 1992 the governm en t establish ed the 'M inistry for the Restoration of the C roatian Republic' w hich in cluded a ' Departm en t for D em ographic Res toration' w hose stated purpose w as to com bat anti-life men tality and to rein force the role of the C roatian family in the Republic. Presid en t Tudjman has gone to great len gth s to demonize w om en w ho choose not to accept their prescribed roles, by claim ing that ' female exhib itionists' Ð w om en w ho opted for pursuing their careers Ð constitute a m ajor dang er to the future of C roatia. This fusion of m asculin ism , nationalis m, and catholic conserv atism w as also dem onstrated just before the republic' s in depend en ce, w hen the slogan 'the foetus is a C roat too!' could be seen on posters and graffiti throughout Croatia.
In Serbia, the nationalis t m ovemen t, to w hich the O rth odox C hurch has been allied , did not focus so stron gly on the issue of abortion , partly due to the tradition of m ore discrete involvem en t in the private realm by the Orth odox C hurch. H ow ever, the public debate on the threat of the ' Albanization' of the formerly autonom ous province of Kosovo and the demographic declin e of the Serbian and M ontenegr in nations that eventu ally culminated in the introduction of a com plex leg al framew ork of reproduction regu lation provid ed am ple evid en ce of the definition of w omen as reproducers of the nation. In its D raft Law on Serbia's Population Policy, the Socialis t Party govern ment effectively proposed that w om en from different ethnic com munities be treated differen tially . The proposed leg islation en visaged the rev ision of existin g righ ts and the in troduction of new res trictive measures and sanctions. M ore precisely, A lb anian fam ilies w ould be pen alized and abortion w ould be indirectly forced upon A lb anian w om en , under the pretex t of a demographic policy that favoured three-child families and penalized larger families, and hen ce ethnic groups w ith a high er birth rate like the Kosovar Albanians (M ilic Â , 1993; Ivecovic, 1995) . On the other hand , in accordance w ith the draft law , child less couples w ould be penalized by havin g to pay added taxes to m ake up for their lack of contribution to the nation' s demographic effort.
The discourses and policy proposals of the moral majority nationalist and pro-life m ovemen ts in C roatia and Sloven ia, and of the nationalist movem en t and regim e in Serbia, illus trate the definition and treatment of w omen as mere ' ins trum en ts' for the achievem en t of the national good, as ' biological reproducers of the nation' .
'M asculinity' and Serbian P op ulism : the A nti-bureaucratic R evolution
The em erg en ce of Serb ian nationalism w as promoted by m obilizin g elem en ts of popular and folk culture (including historically conditioned fears and anxieties) . These cultural comm itm en ts, fears, and anxieties w ere articulated in term s of the official discourse promoted by sections of the state bureaucracy and the party. H aving realized the potential of nationalis m, party leaders supported a policy of chang e in the party and the state apparatus that w ould allow the fusion of the nationalist m ovemen ts of Serb ia and M onten eg ro and the old ins titutional actors of the Republic (m ainly the Serb ian L eague of C om munists). W e can trace the in tensification of this process in 1987 w hen one of the best know n m em bers of this faction, Slobodan M iloševic Â , then a relatively young dyn am ic leader, emerged and occupied the foreg round of Serbian and Yugoslav politics. M iloševic Â placed him self at the centre of the emergin g nationalist m ovement after his 1987 visit to Kosovo Polje, w here he pled ged to protect the members of the Serb ian and M ontenegr in m inority of the province from ' pers ecution by the A lbanian majority' . By adopting a nationalist rh etoric, allyin g him self w ith the Serb ian Orth odox church, reinf orcing the m oral panic regard ing the ' Alb anization' of Kosovo, and m obilizing aspects of folk and popular culture (Sofos, forthcomin g) M iloševic Â w as able to capture the party leadersh ip. H is success, in other w ords, w as en abled by manipulating various elem en ts of popular concern such as the ever-w iden ing Serb ian perception that Yugoslavia w as underm inin g ' Serbian righ ts' , the emotional ties of Serbs w ith Kosovo, and the w idespread popular dismay w ith the inflexible adm inistra tive-bureaucratic system of their republic as w ell as the Federation as a w hole.
U pon capturin g pow er, M iloševic Â launched the anti-bureaucratic revolution, a campaign intend ed to ' cleanse' the party and state apparatus of 'inefficient bureaucrats' and to facilitate the take-over of republic and Fed eration in stitutions. In the nam e of the anti-bureaucratic revolution and of the restoration of Serbian righ ts and prid e, M iloševic Â passed legisla tion w hich allow ed the change of the Serbian constitution (w hich he presen ted as dysfunctional and theref ore an obstacle to the anti-bureaucratic res tructurin g of the state), the effective abolition of the autonom ous status of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodin a, and the purge of civil serv ants , ind ustry managers , journalists and univers ity staff w ho w ere alleged ly obstacles to his reform s. In the province of Kosovo, these purges acquired an ethnic dimen sion as the A lb anian majority population w as forced out of sig nificant positions , and A lb anian cultural ins titutions (universities , schools, m edia) w ere forced to close or starved of funds.
The official justification for the launching of the anti-bureaucratic rev olution w as that the bureaucracy had impeded the developm en t of the Serb ian territories and had contrib uted to the`selling -out`of Serbian national interest. The M iloševic Â reg im e cultivated a populist discourse according to w hich Serb ian society w as deeply and irrecon cilably divid ed into tw o opposing camps: that of the people', hard w orkin g and honest, preserv ing the culture of the national comm unity, and that of the 'ruling bureaucracy' w hich had betrayed the people's hopes and w as represen ted as alien , corrupt and indifferen t to the fate of Serb ia, and thus as not belon ging to the people.
A n im portant discursive strategy em ployed in the positing of this antagonistic relationsh ip betw een the people and the corrupt bureaucracy drew upon a m asculin ist definition of the people. According to official and popular representations of the opponen ts Ð actual or potential Ð to the M iloševi c Â regim e the ' bureaucrat' or 'old regim e official' w as effeminate, and ' unm anly ', in contrast to the ideal repres en tatives of the w ork ing people, w ho w ere regard ed as real Ð m asculin e Ð men (Salecl, 1994, p. 23) . This association of Serbian identity w ith ' manlin ess' and of ' enem ies' of the Serbian nation w ith lack of m asculin e traits had in the past been a feature of popular Serb ian stereotypes of Croats. It has become, more recen tly, prev alent especially in the discourse and rituals of the ex trem ist w ings of the Serbian nationalist m ovemen t: Vojslav Seselj, leader of the SRS (Serbian Radical Party), has often praised the stren gth and decisiv en ess of ' the Serb ian masculine arm ' in the struggle against the en em ies of Serb ia both insid e and outsid e the country . In this context, the ' national' or the 'popular' community w as defined on the basis of the particular version s of masculinity prevalen t in Serb ian folk and popular culture and those excluded from it w ere effectively deem ed to lack the attributes of real m en . The association of m anliness w ith the Serb ian nation w as a significant feature of the bureaucratic rev olution of the late 1980s and had im portant effects not only at the level of representation and iden tity form ation, but also at the level of the leg al and political sy stem . It partly contributed to delegitim atizin g factions of the political elite opposed to the rise of Slobodan M iloševi c Â and to the developm en t of extra-institutional form s of political leg itim ation and mobilization.
Ethnic C on flict and the 'R e territorialization' of R ape
This reliance of the reg im e on m asculin ist perceptions of the national comm unity, how ever, has been clearer in the former' s identification of Kosovo A lb anians as the prim ary , ethnic, en em y of the Serbian nation. Serbs consid er Kosovo (or Kosova, as it is called by its Albanian m ajority inhabitants) to have been the spiritual cradle of Serb ian C hris tendom, the cen tre of the m edieval Serbian Em pire that w as eventu ally destroyed by the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans. The m odern Serb ian nation-build ing project w as prem ised on the promotion of a collective m em ory associated w ith the sanctity of Kosovo, and the significance of the Serbian sacrifice there. A collective memory of the battle survived in the local oral tradition and folk songs , w hile the Serb ian O rth odox church in vested the defeat and death of Prin ce Lazar w ith a mystical dim en sion . Such is the pow er of the history and mythology of Kosovo that the head of the A ssociation of Serb W riters , M atija B eckovic, stated that Kosovo w ould be Serbian even if not a sin gle Serb lived there. In 1986, m em bers of the Serbian A cadem y of Sciences, in their M em orand um , presented the situation in Kosovo as equivalen t to a national defeat. A lthough in m odern -day Kosovo the A lbanian population outnum bers Serbs and M ontenegr ins nin e to one, the provin ce still occupies a central position among the m arkers and sy mbols of Serb ian iden tity. A s in the case of the anti-bureaucratic revolution, in Serbian nationalist discourse the relations hip betw een Albanians and Serb s has been posited as one of irrec oncilable antagonism because the Alb anians w ere repres en ted as stealin g Serbian land, and w ere perceived to be threatening the culture of the Serb ian nation (see for example Petrovi c Â and Blagojevic Â , 1988) .
In this climate of antagonism betw een Serbs and Alb anians , the nationalist m ovemen t and the Serbian m ass m edia exploited cases of rapes attrib uted to nationalist m otives in Kosovo and orchestra ted a m oral panic. 5 In fact, rape has constituted one, albeit the m ost potent elem en t of a w ider m oral panic regard ing the 'A lb anization' of Kosovo. This panic climaxed in 1987, w hen M iloševic Â , w hile visitin g Kosovo, met local Serb s and M onten eg rin s w ho accused the A lb anian majority of intim idation and violence against person s and property and requested his support. These allegations becam e a perm anen t or recurren t theme of new s reports from the province and trigger ed reaction from political, relig ious and cultural lead ers as w ell as from the public. But one of the most decisive m omen ts in the developmen t of the moral panic cam e w hen cases and rumours of rape of Serb ian w om en by A lb anians w ere taken up and ex ploited by the media. As early as in 1981 Serbian clergy accused Albanian Kosovars of havin g raped Serbian nuns (Ram et, 1995, p. 111) w hile in the m id-1980s allegations of rape of Serb ian w om en by A lbanian males increased consid erab ly (M ilic Â , 1993, pp. 114± 15) . Although the local Serb ian and M onten eg rindom inated police had been reluctant to initiate investiga tions in rape cases in the past, during the mid-1980s, and under pres sure from the Serb nationalists in the provin ce, they became increasing ly interested in instances of alleged rape or sexual assault of Serbian or M onten eg rin w omen by A lbanians. Rape acquired therefore a dimen sion of ethnic antagonism . It w as argued by nationalists and the local authorities that these rapes constituted prem editated attacks against Kosovo Serbs and, by extens ion, the Serb ian nation.
A central narrative of Serb ian nationalism , that of the nation-und er-th reat, w as supported theref ore by the red efinition of rape as a w eapon used in the ethnic conflict betw een A lb anians and Serb s. In m ed ia and political discourse, accordingly, rape victims w ere red efined as Serb s at the expens e of their in dividual and collective iden tities as w omen. They w ere often referred to or visually represen ted as Serb ian mothers or w ives, and so pres cribed roles of actual or potential reprod ucers of the nation, as ins trum en tal to the pres ervation of the patrilin e. Public in terest w as directed not tow ard s the individ ual cases of rape but tow ard s the ' rape of the nation by Albanians ' (Milic Â , 1993, pp. 115± 16; Salecl, 1994) . Thus, against the background of the political antagonism in Kosovo, in the popular imagin ary w omen becam e sym bols and property of the national com munity, mark ers of national id en tity. Their violation w as reterritorialized 6 by becom ing prim arily an act of ethn ic violen ce ins tead of an express ion of gen der pow er relations. By contrast, Albanians assum ed the role of the rapists of Serb ian w om en , hen ce of Serbian culture and national iden tity. It is in terestin g to note that in m ost media accounts of alleged rapes, the A lb anian rapists w ere represen ted as im potent (Saleci, 1994, p. 23 ), unable to succeed in violating Serbian w omen. H ere, impotence could be understood as sym bolically emasculating the alleged A lb anian perpetrators, theref ore underm inin g their masculinity and possib ly their claim to nationhood. W hereas the rape of Serbian and M ontenegrin w om en by Albanian men in Kosovo w as perceived and represen ted by Serb nationalists as a form of ethn ic agg res sion, the 'm eaning ' of rape and sexual assault in Bosn ia-H erzeg ovina has been m ore complex. The reasons are num erous. In Kosovo the distinction betw een its Slavic and Albanian populations has been apparen t, not only in term s of religion , but also in term s of lin guistic differenc e and an histo rically conditioned hatred and fear of A lbanian conspiracy against Serbia. In addition, as the victims belon ged to the Serb ian and the alleged perpetrators to the A lb anian comm unity, rape could be seen as an act of agg ress ion agains t the Serbian nation. In Bosnia-H erzeg ovina the com plexity of ethnic division s betw een the Bosnian M uslim s and other speakers of Serbo-C roatia gave ris e to m ore complex and am biguous in terpretations of rape am ong Serb and C roat nationalists. M oreover, despite the fact that rape in w ar-time is not uncomm on, the practice of sy stem atic rape that has been takin g place in Bosnia-H erzegovina need ed som e kin d of ' leg itim ation' among those w ho perpetrated it.
There is no doubt that in Bosnia-H erzegovina, just as in every w ar, rape and violation of w om en constitute an expres sion and reaffirm ation of male dom inance over w omen. H ow ever, such interpretations 7 do not take into account the processes of deterritorialization/reterritorialization of rape in the context of ethnic violence. Indeed , there are indications that the practice of rape in Bosnia-H erzeg ovina is often associated by its perpetrators w ith a need to assert their dom inance over their fem ale victims, or to attain m ere gratification (Vulliam y, 1994, p. 200; Gutman, 1993) . But there are also indications that such practice has been closely lin ked w ith the intention to hum iliate or terrorize, and thus to facilitate the process of ' ethnic cleans ing'. It has reflected on several occasion s, then , a w ill of the perpetrators to ' colonize' their victim s (Vulliam y 1994, p. 199). W hat is certain is that rape has very often acquired an ethnic dimen sion in a conflict in w hich the logic of ethnic division has subsum ed most discourses and practices. 8 M y concern in the res t of this paper is to sugg est som e w ays of critically analysing the sy stem atic rape and violation of w omen in Bosnia and H erzeg ovina by reading them in term s of the nationalist myth ologies projected by each of the sid es involved in the conflict. In particular, I am concern ed to m ap the national gen ealogies these m yth ologies express , and to specify the place Bosnian M uslim s occupy w ithin them .
B iology, C ulture and G en der in the G enealog ies of Sou th Slav Soc ieties
Like m ost nationalist narratives, South Slav gen ealogies are prem ised on a volatile mixture of notions of biological and cultural continuity of the various South-Slav nations. Serb and C roat nationalists in particular have consisten tly competed in their attempts to project their res pective nations to rem ote historical period s in w hich alleged precursors of the contem porary nation-states of Serbia and C roatia d omin ated the region . This desperate search in history for a justification for the pursuit of a Greater Serbia or a Greater C roatia has in variably inv olved claim s on Bosnia-H erzeg ovina and its inhabitants . Ind eed , the turbulen t history of the reg ions of form er Yugoslavia, characterized by a succession of conquest w ars, successive m igratory flow s, national lib eration w ars and relatively recently establish ed nation-states, has been conducive to such attempts. All this has contributed to the form ulation of nationalist narratives in w hich reclaim ing the past and restoring historical justice (including reclaiming Bosnia and, possibly, the Bosnian M uslim s) occupied a sign ificant position .
These elem ents of South Slav nationalis t discourse have been cen tral in rituals of national regene ration throughout the republics of former Yugoslavia, but they w ere presen t especially in Serbia durin g the 1980s. A fter 1987, the Serbian reg ime sanctioned and the Serbian-Orth odox C hurch organized tw o sets of ' national' rituals: mass baptism s of Serbs and M ontenegr ins in Kosovo Polje, and the ' process ion' of the alleg ed rem nants of Prin ce Lazar through Serb-populated villages and monasteries from C roatia and Bosnia-H erzegovina to Kosovo Polje (1988± 89) w here they w ere eventu ally rein terred after a funeral cerem ony. The return of the ' heroic' prin ce to the place w here the Serb s had been defeated by the T urks and w here Lazar lost his life w as represen ted as the completion of a full circle, as a ' new begin ning'. Both rituals constituted a sym bolic confirmation of the w ill of the Serb nation to restore and reclaim its ' dign ity' and ' rig hts' that, according to Serbian nationalis ts, had been underm ined by successive conquerors of the area and former Yugoslavia. The mass baptism s of Serb s in Kosovo as w ell as the return of Prince Lazar' s relics to Kosovo in fact constituted m eaning-creating or, m ore precisely , nation-institu ting rituals. The former w ere effectively pilgrim ages w hereas the latter had an effect somew hat sim ilar to those that Turn er associates w ith pilg rim age (1974; also A nderson , 1983, p. 56) . U nlik e pilg rim ages, how ever, in this case it w as not travellin g to, or coexistence at, a given sacred or administra tive centre that constituted the main m eaning-creating ex perien ce. It w as the route of the procession that demarcated the ' territories of the Serb ian nation' and brough t together Serb s from Serbia proper and those areas w ithin differen t republics and provin ces of former Yugoslavia. A n important aspect of both types of ritual is their emphasis on ' cultural reg en eration'. H ow ever, the centrality of Prince Lazar's rem ains (bones) in the latter ritual affirm s the cultural/spiritual as w ell as physical/biological en durance of the national com munity, for, in the C hristian -Orth odox tradition, relics of saintly figures Ð and Prince Lazar is considered to be such a figure Ð have spiritual value. T his coex isten ce of the m aterial and the spiritual, of biological and cultural continuity, has been comm on in Serb ian nationalist discourse.
The lin k betw een biology and culture, w ith greater em phasis on the former, has also been presen t in family gen ealogies. Recen tly, a member of the former Yugoslavian and Serbian Karadzeordzevic dy nasty, Prince Tomislav, emphasized the resem blance betw een his grandson and King Petar of Yugoslavia, pointing out the persiste nce of (presumably Serbian as w ell as royal) genes throughout the genera tions despite the (ethnically) m ixed m arriages in the royal family. Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the B osnian Serbs, also stres sed the importance of biological contin uity and the patrilin e by pointing to facial characteristics shared by himself, his son, and his alleg ed ancestor Vuk Karadzic (1787± 1864), an eminen t Serb ian intellectual, language reform er and national ideologist. 9 In both cases, biological continuity among the male m em bers of the fam ily is stressed in order to rein force arg um en ts of cultural contin uity Ð belon gin g to the Serb ian nation (interes tingly lin ked to the patrilin e) Ð and to legitim ize the political ambitions of contem porary political person alities .
Just as in family gen ealogies, the notions of cultural and biological continuity have been central in definitions of national comm unities and have played a significant role in the conflict in Bosnia-H erzeg ovina. Bosnia-H erzegovina is a region of form er Yugoslavia w here the three majority ethnic groups (Muslim s, Serbs, C roats) had coexisted in relative harm ony for long periods. H ow ever, the relative stability of the reg ion and the tradition of coexisten ce of differen t national and den ominational com munities have been depend en t, at least partly , upon the existenc e of outsid e 'stabilizing ' factors. The Ottoman and H absb urg empires and, in the tw en tieth century, the tw o Yugoslav states managed to an extent to sustain and en courage a tradition of tolerance (Schoup, 1995) . W hen ever these external stabilizing forces w aned, how ever, national rivalries emerged , en couraged by the nationalists among the tw o major national groups of the reg ion, the Serb s and the C roats. A s m en tioned in the prev ious pages, both national cultures have nurtured myths of national loss to justify their resp ective nationalistic claim s over Bosnia. A ccording to extrem ist but not unpopular variants of C roatian nationalis m, Bosn ia-H erzeg ovina is C roatian territory and its M uslim comm unity is ess en tially C roat, its adheren ce to Islam and its particular culture being merely the leg acy of O ttom an occupation of the region . It sh ould be emphasized at this point that the apparen t mutual incompatibility of these contradictory definitions is often neutralized in practice, or suppress ed through their inclusion in a chain of equivalen t elem ents in nationalist discourse. In the case of Serb ian nationalism upon w hich I prim arily focus here, ' bein g an islamized Serb ' and ' being a Turk ' are equivalen t definitions in term s of their irrecon cilable opposition to the Serbian nation.
1 2 This, I believ e, is very important. It provid es a double ' justification' for the ferocity of Serb nationalists against Bosnian M uslim s. The latter are seen firs t as extern al en em ies, totally foreign to the national ' body' and, therefore, conquerors or usurpers of w hat is ' righ tfully ' Serb ian territory and, second , as traitors w ho comm itted the ultim ate treason for they chose not to suffer like their O rthodox breth ren by ren ouncing their Serb ian culture and converting to Islam. Am ong the multiple antagonistic relations upon w hich contem porary Serb ian nationalist discourse is prem ised, this contradictory represen tation of M uslim s occupies a significant position. One of the raisons d'être of Serbian nationalis m is the ' rectification of historical injus tice' . T his injustice is perceived in the case of Bosnia-H erzeg ovina as eith er the pres en ce of foreig ners (Turks) on Serbian soil, or the comm ission of treason by members of the Serb nation (islamized Serb s), or both. T hese definitions and their associated attitudes w ere reflected in the contem porary versions of Serbian`folk epic`songs devised by sold iers of the irreg ular Serb m ilitias or of the 'regu lar' Bosn ian Serb arm y, often w ith the en couragem en t of their leadersh ip.
1 3 The stated objective of the w ar in these songs is clearly cultural conquest Ð baptism Ð of the Bosn ian M uslim s, thus in dicating an implicit recognition of the ' ess en tially' Serbian nature of Bosnian M uslim s or, at least, of the possibility of their becomin g part of Serbdom . It should be stressed that, according to these folk sin gers, this conquest is often seen as a conq uest of w om en . O ne verse from an epic song perfectly exemplified this: ' Turkish daugh ter our monk s w ill soon baptize you' .
A ccording to the ' folk-song', w ar is not m erely an exclusively m ale busin ess. Ind eed , w herea s it is implied that ' Turkish' m en are to die in battle, the ' Turkish ' nation w ill be eradicated through the convers ion of Turkish daugh ters . W omen here are not merely civilian victim s of the w ar, acciden tal casualties of hostilities as they are usually represented , but also direct victims, en emies w hose soul at least is to be captured or reclaim ed.
H ow ever, through out the w ar, there has been no eviden ce of Serbs proselytizing, or of M uslim s w illing to be baptized. C learly, conversion had never been an option in the conflict; rather, it w as a threat or inv itation that w as never in tended to m aterialize. H ow ever, if the soul cannot be conquered , the body certainly can be. The interch ang eability of the notions of ethnicity and race, of culture and biology in the popular im agin ation, seem s to be an important dimen sion of the Serbian (and m ore genera lly South Slav) nationalist/populist imaginary. In the ' battleground ', therefore, M uslim s, having served as a leg itim izing factor in Serbian claim s of land by bein g recognized as ' islam ized' Serbs, are confronted as Turks , as alien s, and therefore as foreign bodies of foreign blood. This representation of the M uslim as alien is irrecon cilable w ith the solution of conversion, as it is not souls that Serbian nationalism is intending to control. It is a nationalism of the blood, and as such it is prim arily prem ised on the (re)construction of a comm unity of blood ties . Serbian m oral regen eration pres upposes the existenc e of such a comm unity.
It is at this point, I believe, that the use of rape in the conflict in former Yugoslavia can be partly understood. There is no doubt that rape and sexual violation of w om en durin g arm ed conflict is not an uncomm on phen omen on, and it is by no m eans an exclusive characteristic of the Bosnian conflict. A necdotal and fragm en ted testim onies and evid en ce indicate that rape and sexual violation have been link ed to and legitim ized on some occasions by nationalist`mythologies' and despite consid erably diverse estim ates, it is clear that rape and sexual assault have been w id espread practices in the w ar. It is also quite possible that the stigm a associated w ith rape and the fear of social rejec tion has contributed to under-rep ortin g such inciden ts. The attitude of som e leaders of the com munities affected by the arm ed conflict in Bosnia is ind icative of the social pressu res and additional victimization of the w om en subjected to sexual assault and rape during the w ar. It is not unrepresen tative. D r Izet A ganovic Â , presid en t of the Red C rescen t in C roatia (and this attitude is by no m eans exclusive to the M uslim side), comm en ting on requests from N orth A frican men to m arry Bosnian rape victims, characterized these m en as ' forgiving ' (The G uardian, 2 A ugust 1993, p. 10) .
A s men tioned in the previous pages, apart from the association of the practice of rape w ith the perpetrators' felt need to assert their dominance over their female victim s, or to attain m ere gratification, rape also has been lin ked closely to tw o aims: to the inten t to hum iliate or terrorize, and thus to facilitate, the process of 'ethnic cleansing '; and to the desire of the perpetrators to ' colonize' the en em y nation by im pregn ating`his w omen '. Indeed , Serbian perpetrators of rape have been reported to have told their victims to ' go and deliv er fightin g Serb s' (Vulliamy, 1994, p. 199) . There is evid en ce also of the existen ce of deten tion sites run by all sid es in the conflict (the U N has iden tified a Serb ian site in D oboj, a C roatian one in D retelj/C apljin a and a M uslim one in C eleb ici/ Konjic). In each case, the perpetrators of rape and sexual assault have stated that their aim w as to impreg nate the w om en detained, and im pregn ated w om en have been detained until it w as too late for a term ination of the pregn ancy (U N C om mittee of Experts Report, Annex IX, pp. 9± 10). In the first case, the ' objective' of ' producing Serbs' is express ly stated, w hile for C roats and M uslim s it is at least implied , although it is possible that a subsidiary objective m ight be the disruption of kins hip ties am ong m em bers of the en em y nation. It is quite clear, how ever, that, as in the Serb ian fam ily gen ealogies examined in the prev ious pages, the nation is identified by perpetrators of rape w ith the patriline. By bein g asked to ' deliver fighting Serb s', M uslim w om en are red uced to m ere vessels , in strum en ts for the reproduction of the nation-as-patrilin e, as their offspring is not only goin g to be a ' Serb' (in the biological sen se) but also ' a fightin g Serb' (in a w ay, Serb in the cultural sen se). It follow s quite clearly that according to the perpetrators of rape Ð and possib ly in the nationalist imaginary of South-Slav societies, the nation is reproduced through its male m em bers. E ven the biological/gen etic contrib ution of w om en is not recognized as significant. This objectification and m argin alization of w omen have been demonstrated by anthropological resea rch on the pastoralist cultures of the rural and mountain ous areas of Bosnia-H erzegovina, M ontenegro and Serb ia from w hich most of the Serb, C roat, and M uslim irregu lars and the majority of their leadersh ip origin ate. These are the areas of the Balkans in w hich the curren t conflict is cen tred . In his stud y of gen der am ong the pastoral populations of the Balkans, D en itch, indicating the m argina lization of w omen in kins hip groups and in the cultural life of the community, suggested that the form al structures in all these societies are based exclusively upon relations am ong male kins men. The only en durin g social units are form ed through the m ale descen t lin e, and w omen are exchanged among these units to procreate future gen erations of m ales, leavin g no end uring m arks of their ow n existen ce in term s of the form al structure. Such sys tem s can be diagramm ed neatly w ithout any w omen at all: w omen serve m erely as link s betw een fathers and sons and betw een m ale in-law s. (1974, p. 246) It is obvious, therefore, that in accordance w ith Balkan pastoralist cultures w omen are not sig nificant componen ts of the nation. Indeed , the decisive elem en t of the nation is male stock. 1 4 Thus rape, perceived as an act of ' fertilization' of w omen, is consid ered an acceptable w ay of rectifying histo rical in justice, the loss of contested lands, and the sacrifices of each of the w arring ethnic com munities . Land and history, therefore, can be and are conquered over w omen' s bodies. In addition, forcing the w om en to give birth to child ren conceived under these conditions constitutes a m eans of contaminating the en em y nation in a number of w ays : biologically and culturally , as the child ren w ould be deem ed to be alien to the national comm unity, and psy chologically , as they migh t contribute to the disruption of the relations betw een fam ily m em bers. To return to D en itch once more, in Balkan pastoral societies
[o]nly as the mother of sons does a w ife secure a place in the group, bound to it through a blood tie. The m ost essentia l function of w omen is, obviously, to serve as bearers of sons for the patrilin e. The fate of barren w omen is in dicative, as they rem ain isolated w ithin the group, unable to forge blood ties w ith it. (p. 251)
In the contemporary conflict, forcibly im pregn ated w om en are in a sen se claimed by the ethn ic comm unity of their rapists; their ties w ith their ow n comm unity are disrupted as the ethn ic comm unity is often seen as an extension of the kin sh ip group.
N eed less to say, these points constitute m erely cursory elem en ts of a tentative exploration of the lin k betw een nationalis t/populist m yth ologies and practices and the use of rape in the conflicts of form er Yugoslavia. They can offer only partial explanation of how the practice of rape migh t acquire specific m eaning s w ithin the universe of nationalist discourse and they are not intended to play dow n the aspects of rape and sex ual assault related to the assertion of m ale dom inance and pow er over w om en .
1 5 I argue, how ever, that w e should focus on the specific articulation of gen der and ethnicity in the im agin ary of those in volved in the conflict in form er Yugoslavia in order to achieve a better understanding of its dynam ics.
In Lieu of a C onclusion
The com mon argum en t regard ing the situation in former Yugoslavia is that the national recogn ition and sovereign ty em phasized by m ost of the protagonists in the conflict led to the recognition of w hat w e can call 'national' righ ts and their prioritiz ation over citizen sh ip rig hts . N everth eles s, the consequen ces of the conflict have been far more im portant. T he conflict has red uced w om en to virtual non-existen ce, and subjected them to humiliation and physical and m en tal violation. The sign ificance of fertility , of the capacity to bear child ren, is obvious, in folk culture, in social policy-related debates, and in som e of the discourses and practices of the combatants in form er Yugoslavia; I have pointed out throughout this paper that the main w ay w om en can be incorporated into the national comm unity is through their prescribed role as its actual or potential reprod ucers. The pred omin ant represen tation of w omen durin g the ethnic conflict has been as biological reprod ucer of the nation. W om en ' s biological role of m otherh ood has been central in the state national projects, and their violation has often been perpetrated in the nam e of reproducing the national com munity.
It is important to rem em ber that w hat is demonstrated in the Yugoslav conflict is not m erely the failure of citizens hip but the rein forcemen t of the conclusion that violen t form s of masculinist and populist prejud ice have been pres en t in the daily relationsh ips betw een men and w om en in one of the`most progressive of state-socialist societies`. N ote s 1. In his analysis of the makin g of the English w orking class Ð although one could argue that the object of study is the emergenc e of the 'English people' Ð E. P. Thom pson (1963) focuses on these processes.
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fellow Yugoslavs regard ing the positions of Serb ia and its leadersh ip. These constituted ' extra-institutional' rituals through w hich the regim e claimed leg itim acy, and on the basis of w hich the identity and unity of the nationalist-populist movem ent w as forged . In this w ay also a ' plebiscitary' form of legitim ation w as establish ed , parallel to that associated w ith the representative ins titutions of the socialis t and post-socialist period , and it rein forced the ' charism atic' authority of M iloševic Â . The 'direct' , 'plain' and ' popular' lang uage used in these even ts very often reflected the pred om inant masculinist them es outlin ed above For a more extensive discussion , see Sofos (forthcomin g).
5. For more on the notion of ' moral panic ' , see C ohen (1974). 6. D eleuze and G uattari (1987) propose seein g deterritorialization as a m ovemen t or ' lin e of fligh t' . A t the level of sign ification, they argue, 'the signify ing regim e certain ly attains a high level of D [eterritorialization] ; but because it sim ultaneously sets up a w hole system of reterritorializations on the sign ified , and on the sign ifier itself, it blocks the lin e of fligh t' (p. 508). I w ould argue that in the case of rape the ' lin e of flig ht' is not blocked en tirely , allow ing for a lim ited reterritorialization that amounts effectively to a substantial red efinition of rape outlined in this section of the article.
7. Prominen t w estern fem inists virtually dismissed the ethnic dimen sions of rape in the conflict in form er Yugoslavia. For a representative sample of the releva nt debate, see Benn ett (1993).
8. Ins tances of this process are presen t in m ost former Yugoslav republics and provin ces. In addition to the ' ethn icization' of rape in the cases of Kosovo and Serb ia outlin ed above, in C roatia, follow ing media reports of sys tem atic rape in Bosnia, the rape of C roatian w omen w as represen ted as the rape of C roatia itself.
9. Both claims of continuity w ere made in Paul Paw likow ski' s Serbian Epics, a BBC 2 Bookm ark programme.
10. This arg um en t is m aintained even today by prominen t m ainstream C roat politicians such as the curren t pres iden t of the Republic, Franjo Tudjm an. Tudjm an has repeatedly ex pressed his vision of ' res torin g the sovereign ty of C roatia w ithin its historical borders' . By this he im plies the G reater C roatia of the Independ en t State of C roatia establis hed by the Germ an occupation forces durin g the Second W orld W ar w hich en compassed most of Bosnia-H erzegovina. On this assum ption Bosnian M uslim s are consid ered to be C roats of ' M uslim faith' .
11. In The M ounta in of W reath , a classic text in Serb ian nationalist literature, Bish op Petar N jeg os calls for the punish ment of the Bosn ian 'converts to Islam ' .
12. O n the notion of equivalence, see Laclau and M ouffe (1985, pp. 127± 34).
13. The Bosnian Serb leadersh ip even res orted to audio-and video-recordin g and dissem inating these ' folk-songs' am ong its troops. For aspects of m asculin ism in these songs , see Lukovic Â (1992).
14. A sim ilar conclusion is reached by the anthropologist D elaney in her study of gen der in Turkish rural society (1991) . Delaney effectively arg ues that, in the Turk ish village comm unity cosm ology, it is the 'seed ' of the male m em bers of the comm unity that determ ines and guarantees its contin uity. The influen ce the Ottoman empire has had in the Balkans, and the existen ce of Turk ish m inorities in the territory of former Yugoslavia, provid e som e tentative indications that Delaney' s rem ark is som ew hat releva nt to my argum en t. I am indebted to Dr Peter Loizos for pointing out Delaney' s w ork to m e.
15. I w ould in deed arg ue that the analysis of rape in the context of the conflict in former Yugoslavia sh ould also take into account a num ber of additional factors, such as gen der pow er relations and the interrelations betw een regu lar sold iers and irregu lar fighters in the battlefield . I cannot elaborate on these dyn amics in the lim ited space of this paper; for an examination of these factors, see Sofos, ' Populis m, Solidarity and M asculin ity: C onstructions of Identity in Ethnic C onflict' , unpublish ed paper.
